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Abstract
We propose a distinction between precategorial, acategorial and categorial
states within a scientically oriented understanding of mental processes. This
distinction can be specied by approaches developed in cognitive neuroscience
and the analytical philosophy of mind. On the basis of a representational the-
ory of mental processes, acategoriality refers to a form of knowledge that
presumes fully developed categorial mental representations, yet refers to non-
conceptual experiences in mental states beyond categorial states. It relies on a
simultaneous experience of potential individual representations and their ac-
tual \representational ground", an undierentiated precategorial state. This
simultaneity is possible if the mental state does not reside in a representation
but in between representations. Acategoriality can be formally modeled as
an unstable state of a dynamical mental system that is subject to particular
stability criteria.
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1 Precategorial and Acategorial Experience:
A Short Historical Survey
The distinction of precategorial and acategorial mental states, as opposed to ordi-
nary categorial mental states, does not feature prominently in present science and
philosophy. In this article, we suggest a framework for a coherent discussion of
all three classes of mental states, with particular emphasis on their usefulness to
highlight crucial dierences among them. We will argue that they nd a natural
place in two areas of current research: in the important contemporary debate of
non-conceptual experiences (see, e.g., Gunther 2003) and in the treatment of mental
dynamical systems in terms of their stability (see, e.g., van Gelder 1998). But there
is some way to go until we reach these points in Sections 5 and 6. Let us rst start
with some historical remarks.
1In recent years, pre- and acategorial states have been discussed in transpersonal
psychology mostly with the terms pre- and transpersonal or pre- and transrational.
The confusion of pre- and transpersonal states (pre/trans-fallacy) is carefully avoided
by many representatives of transpersonal psychology (see Wilber 1980, 1981).1 Nev-
ertheless, outside of transpersonal psychology a dierentiation of these two states is
not so common. Since they both dier from categorial states, it is tempting to in-
terpret them both as exceptional states with \mystical" qualitites (see Ernst 2005).
Similarly, current discussions in the philosophy of mind about \non-conceptual" ex-
periences hardly focus on the special qualities of acategorial states. We will address
pertinent examples below.
Another thread has tried to reconcile pre- and acategorial mental states with
recent developments in consciousness studies, cognitive science and psychology. It is
based on an account of mental systems in terms of the theory of dynamical systems.
A rst description of the general idea is due to Atmanspacher (1992). A more
detailed illustration, alluding to early remarks by James (1890/1950, Chap. XI),
with a number of phenomenological examples has been given by Atmanspacher and
Fach (2005), see also Feil (2007).
The distinction of pre- and acategoriality indicates dierent experiences of a
subject concerning moments of (pre-categorial) self-dissolution or (acategorial) self-
transgression. More generally, one possibility leads to the destabilization and dis-
integration of mental categories (including the category of the ego or self), another
possibility leads to the transgression of these categories without actually dissolving
or annihilating them.2
The distinction of these two options can be found in both oriental and occidental
spiritual and philosophical traditions. For an introductory outline of the dierent
qualities of pre- and acategoriality we present two Western approaches of quite
dierent origin and impact on the history of philosophy, which nevertheless show
a number of similarities: (i) the approach of Gebser, proposing a cultural history
of consciousness as represented in his The Ever-Present Origin (Gebser 1986),3 and
(ii) the inuential rationalist-denitorial approach by Spinoza (1994), as developed
in his Ethics.
The very notion of acategoriality goes back to Gebser who introduced it as a key
1For a comprehensive critical review of the paradigms of transpersonal theory Ferrer (2002) can
be consulted.
2Throughout this article, the notion of a category is used in a distinctly psychological sense.
Basically, it denotes the result of a (binary) classication which is crucial for the development
of particular forms of consciousness and of knowledge. The philosophical notion of a category,
introduced by Aristotle and often redened and reinterpreted in the history of philosophy (e.g., by
Kant) is explicitly not addressed here.
3Gebser is a Swiss author around the middle of the 20th century. The German original of The
Ever-Present Origin has the title Ursprung und Gegenwart (Gebser 1949/1953) and oers a kind
of cultural genealogy of consciousness based on a huge variety of anthropological material. The
description of dierent structures of consciousness as \archaic", \magic", \mythical", \mental",
and \integral", popularized by Wilber, was originally coined by Gebser.
2feature of what he called the integral structure of consciousness. It will be shown
that this notion is epistemologically meaningful and coherent. Gebser uses the term
acategoriality to describe experiences both leaving behind thinking in categories
and at the same time preserving the dierentiation and autonomy of categories. He
speaks of \being aware" (German: \Gewahrsein") and puts this mode of conscious-
ness in a spiritual context. It is his intention to comprehend the multiplicity of
particular aspects in their relatedness to a unique \absolute" origin (Gebser 1986,
see, e.g., pp. 3, 19f, 267, 528).
Hence, acategoriality refers to a mode of consciousness dierent from both pre-
categorial and categorial modes. Categorial modes, the main object of present-day
cognitive science and philosophy of mind, are generally understood as conceptual
mental representations and their processing by binary classication schemes. Binary,
or Boolean, classications are assignments of elements in such a way that they either
belong to a particular category or they do not belong to it (tertium non datur). The
rules of classical logic are based on this kind of categorization. Conclusions derived
from these rules require sequential processing, and they are either true or false.
Precategoriality (sometimes referred to as non-categoriality) essentially refers to
a mental state in a situation of not yet developed or dissolved categories. For in-
stance, categories may loose their explicit conceptual structure and logical connect-
edness and become processed associatively, like in dreams or free imaginations. Some
experiences playing a role in creativity and intuition are presumably attributable to
the precategorial domain of associations. An even more drastic loss of categories
can occur under conditions of intoxication or trance. Intense sensory perceptions
without categorial classication can convey a feeling of unity and connectedness
with the environment. Mental states in which associations and poorly dierentiated
sensory experiences are predominant belong to the precategorial domain.
Particular experiences of a comprehensive unity, not due to dissolved categories
but due to transgressed limits of established and maintained categories, are what
Gebser describes as acategorial. In this understanding, acategoriality is an epistemic
act leaving established categories intact as potential objects of awareness. However,
they are not object of sequential and conclusive processing. Categories remain the
basis of such epistemic acts, but they are transcended.
A view into the history of philosophy shows that (the distinction of pre- and)
acategorial experience was proposed several times through the centuries, though with
dierent terminology: Plotin's knowledge of the One, Spinoza's scientia intuitiva,
and intellectuale Anschauung introduced by Schelling and H olderlin all characterize
an acategorial mode of knowledge. Let us look at Spinoza to understand what an
experience of unity at an acategorial level means to him.
Spinoza (1994, II, P40f, schol. 2) distinguishes three kinds of knowledge. First
of all, he mentions \opinion" or \imagination", referring to an experience which
derives from perception but is not exhaustively categorized by logical rules; it is
mainly precategorial. The rationalist Spinoza does not value this kind of knowledge
particularly highly because, in his opinion, it does not allow us to discern clearly the
3true from the false. Such a distinction is only possible when \reason", the second
kind of knowledge, is reached. The \universal" or \common" notions of reason
enable us to have \adequate ideas of the properties of things". These notions are
categorial; they are built and analyzed by formal knowledge according to the rules
of classical logic.
The third kind of knowledge Spinoza addresses is \intuition". This scientia
intuitiva gives us the \adequate knowledge of the (...) essence of things". It follows
formal knowledge, but in contrast to it there are no sequential conclusions from A to
B. According to Spinoza, scientia intuitiva perceives the connectedness of particular
things \in one glance". Such an intuitive view shows both the particular things and
their position within the whole. It is neither precategorial-associative nor categorial-
discursive but appears as one immediate and comprehensive experience.
For Spinoza scientia intuitiva ultimately means nothing less than the knowledge
of God. Being aware of the connectedness of particulars within and with the whole
the experiencing subject sees how particulars are founded in the whole and obtain
their determination from it. The One, the absolute and divine principle, is seen in
the dierentiated and connected unity. The immersion into this absolute One as
the nal step of a Spinozist-type of intuitive view is later discussed by Schelling and
H olderlin (Feil 2005, 2007).
It remains to be claried in more detail how acategorial mental states can be
conceived from the perspective of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. The
present article tries to nd a place for acategorial experience in contemporary con-
sciousness studies. For this purpose, section 2 addresses the spectrum of forms of
knowledge discussed in current philosophy of mind. Intersubjective knowledge is
distinguished from subjective knowledge (2.1). Then subjective knowledge is con-
sidered in its propositional form (2.2) on the one hand and in its non-propositional
form (2.3) on the other. Subsequently the notion of a category is characterized in
some detail (2.4), and on this basis an analytical distinction of pre- and acategorial
experience is proposed (2.5).
Section 3 highlights the fundament of forms of knowledge: the concept of a
mental representation that is basic for cognitive science. The meaning of the term
\representation" is elucidated (3.1) and the signicance of mental representations is
specied (3.2). It is reected which attribute distinguishes a mental representation
from other representations (3.2.1) and which versions of a mental representation are
required to realize knowledge in all its forms (3.2.2).
Section 4 addresses pre- and acategorial experience, respectively, within a the-
ory of mental representations. Metzinger's interpretation of mystical experience as
oceanic self-dissolution accompanied by a loss of phenomenal consciousness is pro-
posed as a particular form of precategoriality. It serves as a starting point to demon-
strate which kinds of phenomenally experiencable states of consciousness could form
the basis of acategorial knowledge.
Section 5 addresses a formal approach examining the phenomenon of acategori-
ality in cognitive neuroscience. As this approach uses a qualitative stability analysis
4of dynamical systems, some basic elements of the theory of nonlinear dynamics are
briey reviewed (5.1). A corresponding concept of stability is presented and used
to specify the insights achieved so far(5.2). It is argued that an acategorial mode
of knowledge can be stringently accounted for in dynamical systems approaches to
cognitive neuroscience.
In Section 6 we relate the important contemporary debate about non-conceptual
experiences and its associated terminology to the notions of categorial, precategorial,
and acategorial states. While categorial states in our understanding are conceptual
by denition, the situation is dierent for pre- and acategorial states. The way in
which it is dierent has to do with dierent deviations from states with conceptual
content.
2 Forms of Knowledge
2.1 Intersubjective Knowledge as Justied Proposition
Spinoza speaks of scientia intuitiva as a highest intuitive knowledge, beyond discur-
sive knowledge. By contrast, the contemporary use of the term knowledge, under-
stood as justied belief, covers only a small fraction of knowledge in general.4
A general criterion for knowledge as justied belief is that an element of knowl-
edge be available in the form of a proposition.5 Propositions require semantic and
syntactic components. This means that they are (i) composed of (meaningful) con-
ceptual categories based on binary classication schemes and (ii) constructed accord-
ing to (grammatical) rules based on classical logic. Then, intersubjective knowledge
is on hand if the truth content of a proposition can be examined by others and it
turns out to be intersubjectively true.
Intersubjective knowledge can be obtained in two dierent ways: a priori and a
posteriori. A proposition is called a priori if it is independent of our perception and
can be understood without recourse to concrete human experience. An example is
the sentence: \bachelors are unmarried" which is correct simply from an analytical
point of view.6 A proposition is called a posteriori if it derives from our sensory per-
4What makes a belief to be considered as justied is a central and sophisticated question in
epistemology, which we cannot discuss in detail here. Compare Steup and Sosa (2005), part III,
p. 251{343, for discussions of this issue.
5Compare Russell (1940, p. 12) who denes the notion of a proposition as follows: \A proposition
is something which may be said in any language: `Socrates is mortal' and `Socrate est mortel'
express the same proposition. In a given language it may be said in various ways: the dierence
between `Ceasar was killed in the Ides of march' and `It was on the Ides of march that Ceasar was
killed' is merely rhetorical. It is thus possible for two forms of words to `have the same meaning'.
We may, at least for the moment, dene a `proposition' as `all the sentence which have the same
meaning as some given sentence'."
6There are other positions subsuming more under a priori knowledge than only analytical
sentences whose content is already xed by the denition of notions. Compare Steup and Sosa
5ception and our experiences. For acategoriality as an experienced state, a posteriori
propositions are particularly relevant.
An experience can be construed as intersubjective knowledge, if it is logically
well-formed and if personal subjective perceptions agree with the facts. This requires
that subjects with the same cognitive abilities perceive the same under the same
conditions.7 A simple example is the subsumption of a perception X under a notion,
such as \X = star". This proposition is considered as true if not only one's own
perception but also that of the others corresponds to the category \star".
Intersubjective knowledge ranges from simple assignments of notions to complex
discursive and abstract thinking. Propositionality stands at the basis of every in-
tersubjective knowledge. If I believe, hope or doubt that \X = star" or \bachelor =
unmarried man", then this is a propositional attitude. If I can justify the content
of this attitude intersubjectively, the result is intersubjective knowledge.
2.2 Subjective Knowledge as Unjustied Proposition
Subjective (rather than intersubjective) knowledge is related to all those proposi-
tional attitudes that cannot be intersubjectively justied. Although such proposi-
tional attitudes may be quantiable and intersubjectively accessible, they cannot be
scrutinized suciently to become justiable. They are always a posteriori and refer
to the perception or experience of individual subjects.
There are epistemological positions which close the spectrum of forms of knowl-
edge at this point. For McDowell (1994, p. 64), e.g., there is no knowledge be-
yond concepts and propositions. He is geared to Kant's concise statement that
\thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant
1998, A51/B75). From this McDowell concludes that the concept of \pure" percep-
tion without conceptual components should play no role at least for the philosophical
theory of human cognition.8
Another approach, elaborated by Fodor (1987), is oriented toward the so-called
\computer metaphor" of the brain.9 In the framework of this metaphor, the func-
tioning of cognitive systems is considered as an interplay between hardware and
software. The brain as a material substrate is assigned the function of the hard-
2005, part I.4, pp. 98{105, or Hanson and Hunter 1993.
7In another context, it requires that scientic equipment or procedures, respectively, yield
reproducible results.
8Compare a corresponding passage in Kant (1998, A90{91/B123): \For appearances could after
all be so constituted that the understanding would not nd them in accord with the conditions of
its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances
nothing would oer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis (...), so that this concept would
therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without signicance."
9This refers to computers with classical von-Neumann architecture. Compare the impressive
book The Computer and the Brain by von Neumann (1958), whose front page in the second edition
of 2000 shows an apple and an orange to illustrate the author's central thesis.
6ware, while mental \programs" control the cognitive processes. Such an approach
permits only propositional, conceptually composed contents, because it presumes
syntax and semantics.
This functionalist approach is based on (i) logical rules (of language) governing
cognitive processes and (ii) concepts with some symbolic function to which a partic-
ular stimulus input (mediated by brain processes) can be assigned. Fodor assumes
that many cognitive processes are controlled by a universal mental language (lingua
mentis) without ever becoming consciously accessible. He also believes that even
those sensory experiences that we cannot conceptualize can be realized this way.10
But there is yet another position, referring to subjective knowledge in terms of
propositional as well as non-propositional mental content (compare, among others,
Dretske 1981, Peacocke 1992, Berm udez and Macpherson 1998). According to this
position there are forms or pre-forms of subjective knowledge which are to be dis-
tinguished in principle from conceptual subjective knowledge. The resulting notion
of non-conceptual mental content (cf. Gunther 2003) addresses two aspects: (i) the
way in which perceived or imagined objects appear to us internally, how they are
phenomenally experienced, and (ii) model-like mental structures composed of such
experiences.
2.3 Subjective Knowledge as Non-Conceptual
Mental Content
Dretske (1981, pp. 135{153) proposes to address the dierence between non-concep-
tual experiences and conceptual knowledge by the terms \analog" and \digital". To
be referred to as digital, information is composed in such a way that a particular
content a and nothing else than a is communicated, for example the perception \X =
star". To be referred to as analog, additional pieces of information are transmitted
together with a, leading to the perception X with many simultaneously experiencable
and innitely rened aspects of perception (degree of brightness, coloredness, etc.;
compare Dretske 1981, p. 137).
Digital knowledge is acquired using simplied unique symbols with discrete spec-
tra and a lawful operation with these symbols. By contrast, analog knowledge is
transmitted continuously. The complexity of a perception, which is analogically
given as a whole, can only be digitalized by successively rened discursive and
sequential processing. The qualitative dierence between these two kinds of infor-
mation can be illustrated by the example of an image (analog transmission) versus
a text (digital transmission).11
From this point of view, Peacocke (1992, pp. 67f) advances the thesis that the in-
formation density of non-conceptual contents can never be exhaustively transformed
10For the state of the art of discussions of a \language of thought" compare Aydede (2004).
11Of course, this comparison does not mean that a perceptual content is an \image". It means
that it reproduces rather than describes.
7into conceptual contents. Metzinger (2003, p. 73) also considers the possibility of
non-conceptual mental content which can be phenomenally experienced, yet not
conceptualized.
An example is a perception with a content that we cannot classify, but which
may contain information. In this case, the analog character of a continuous trans-
mission and the particular subjective quality of perceptual experience persist. The
smell of burning wood is always a perception \of something" and will always smell
\somehow", even if we do not know anything about wood or the smell of burning.
The eect of such a perception is at least the information that there is something
new or unknown. This can have a function for the perceptual system, cause a higher
level of attention, feelings of comfort or discomfort.
Thus, perception can persist without conceptual knowledge, and it can have at
least some informative function. For sense perceptions to provide more than their
unique phenomenal quality, however, categorizing processes are necessary.
2.4 Perceptual and Conceptual Categories
The distinction of analog and digital knowledge is backed up by studies about early
category formation (see Mandler 2003, pp. 453f). While the notion of a category is
often restricted to a conceptual category, the notion of a perceptual category serves
to describe structures of experiences which are not (yet) conceptualized. Percep-
tual categories derive from the perceived similarity of phenomena; they are formed
involuntarily, and their formation requires no conscious attention. By contrast,
conceptual categories derive from conscious perceptions and conclusions, from the
application of rules.
Experiments with one-year-old children show how perceptual and conceptual
category formation go hand in hand. The distinction of the categories \creature"
and \furniture" is driven rstly by an unconscious primal comparison of perceptual
dierences. It is followed by the conscious conceptual conclusion that creatures do
autonomously move while furniture does not. Perceptual renement may occur as
a third step.12
The notion of a model has been proposed to delineate the analog and implicit
structure of a perceptual category from that of a concept with a digital and explicit
structure.13 A perceptual-analog model already enables simulations (conceptions
not bound to actual stimulus input) and an orientation of action toward future
goals.
12It can be assumed that the ner-grained equivalence classes of so-called \basic level" cate-
gories are formed perceptually (Rosch 1978), while the coarser-grained equivalence classes (global
categories) are formed inductively by conclusion (Mandler 2000).
13Compare Metzinger (1993, pp. 104{135), who refers to McGinn (1989) and Johnson-Laird
(1983). The proposal by Johnson-Laird (1983, pp. 146{151), who denes a mental model as a
hybrid form of digital and analog elements, is modied and understood purely analogically by
Metzinger.
8It is controversially discussed how in detail such analog models are structured.
Either a prototype is formed from similar stimuli already at a perceptual level, or the
model derives from an accumulation of perceived examples.14 The assignment of a
percept to a perceptual category is then formed by comparison with this prototype or
by comparison with the majority of examples. In both cases, a perceptual category
consists of objects and structure-preserving mappings among those objects.15
If the implicit structure of a perceptual model is conceptually isolated and be-
comes explicit, the analog content of a category can be addressed digitally. The
digitalized structure, i.e. the concept, can now be consciously applied to perceptual
contents. (Successive) binary classications enable a unique assignment of a per-
cept to a category. Once there are rules that aord binary classications, e.g. the
rule that creatures move autonomously, they can serve a preparatory function for
concept formation.16
Ultimately, perceptual and conceptual content are combined in a category. But
this does not mean that one is inconceivable without the other. There are concep-
tual categories without analog content, for instance the philosophical category of a
\thing-in-itself", referring to things independent of any kind of perception. On the
other hand, there may be analog models that are categorized perceptually but not
digitalized. Examples are all kinds of operations that are not made explicit in se-
quences of conceptual categories. Moreover, there is the particular case of a singular
phenomenal experience for which, by denition, no categories are formed yet.
2.5 Epistemological Characterization of Precategoriality
and Acategoriality
With the background of Secs. 2.1{2.4, we are now in the position to characterize
the distinction of precategorial and acategorial knowledge in terms of contemporary
analytic epistemology and consciousness research. The notion of precategoriality, as
introduced above, can have a twofold interpretation:
1. It can indicate a state which is non-conceptual and completely non-categorial
in the sense that it exhibits neither perceptual models nor conceptual categories.
This might be a form of information preceding any category formation (e.g., a com-
14The prototype thesis goes back to Rosch and Mervis (1975). The authors are concerned
with natural categories which can be understood as an aggregation of phenomena, in the sense
of perceptual category formation. Currently, the prototype thesis is also discussed for conceptual
category formation, see Hampton (2003).
15A mapping f : A ! B is structure-preserving if neighboring points in a vector space A remain
neighbors in a vector space B into which they are mapped by f. Particular mappings, so-called
intertwiners, guarantee such a preservation of structure (\topological equivalence") even if objects
\look" dierently. See MacLane (1998).
16A concept in this sense is not yet a denotation by language. Although the development
of conceptual thinking and of language inuence each other, the development of consciousness
requires conceptual elements prior to language (Mandler 2002, pp. 316f).
9pletely novel phenomenal experience) or a situation in which any categorial stabi-
lization is lost (e.g., states of intoxication or trance). Such cases present extreme
forms of precategoriality, which could be interesting for a discussion of particular
exceptional (\mystical") experiences.
2. Precategoriality can also indicate forms of knowledge relying on analog-
perceptual models prior to digital-conceptual category formation. This could refer
to perceptions classied due to similarity relations and simulations with models,
independent of actual stimulus input. In this case, mental processes do not operate
according to logical rules but are consistent with needs and expectations internal to
the system.17
These two variants of precategoriality belong to the domain of subjective knowl-
edge, but they are neither (fully) conceptual nor (fully) propositional. They are,
therefore, not subject to a valuation by truth criteria. Their assessment has to
follow from the benet for the system and, accordingly, from the adequacy of the
received information for it. By contrast, conceptual knowledge makes experiences
addressable by propositions. Only this entails that an evaluation of information in
terms of true or false becomes relevant, and intersubjective knowledge emerges.
The precategorial is, thus, a non-propositional form of subjective knowledge,
based on experiences with non-conceptual content, that diers fundamentally from
the propositional domain. This dierence provides the key to distinguish the precat-
egorial from the acategorial. We will argue that conceptual-propositional knowledge
(of subjective or intersubjective kind) is a necessary (but clearly not sucient) con-
dition for acategoriality (Sec. 4). Acategorial states, other than precategorial states,
require existing, fully developed categories to become possible (Sec. 5.2).
Nevertheless we will classify acategorial experience as a non-conceptual state,
presuming that the existing concepts are not actualized by the experiencing sub-
ject (Sec. 6). In this sense acategorial states dier from categorial-conceptual states
(where a particular concept is represented) as well as from purely perceptual states.
Spinoza's \intuition" does not process an isolated concept or percept, but appre-
hends all given concepts directly as a whole { like an \in-between state" that vanishes
as soon as concepts (or isolated percepts) are \grasped".
Although this is an appealing framework, acategoriality is hardly discussed in
present-day analytic philosophy of mind. Before we will present approaches enabling
such a discussion, a basic notion must still be claried that is inevitable for most
models of knowledge in cognitive science: the notion of a mental representation. It
contains the notion of a category, but also comprises novel experiences that are not
yet categorized. It is generally considered as a mandatory element of any form of
knowledge.
17The notion of precategoriality as used by Gebser (1986) refers mostly to this second type of
precategoriality: a mental state prior to conceptual categorization.
103 Mental Representation
A mental system receives information about external and internal domains by men-
tal representations which are actualized by corresponding states of the system. A
representation has to fulll dierent conditions in order to be suitable for mental
processes: It must have causal, functional and, in some cases, also structural aspects
capable of carrying information. It must be potentially accessible to phenomenal
consciousness so as to satisfy specic criteria of the mental. Phenomenally experi-
encable representations come in a multiplicity of variants to be discussed in Section
3.2.2.
3.1 Representation in Information-Processing Systems:
Causality, Functionality, Structurality
A representation can be considered as either a process of information transmission
or an information content. A representation B can represent an actual situation A if
(i) there is a process establishing this reference relation and (II) if there is a process
backtracking this reference relation to its referent. The notion of a representation
can be described as a three-place relation between that which represents, that which
is represented, and the representing relation.
Dierent possibilities are conceivable for a reference relation. One of them is a
relation in terms of signs, where a sign (e.g., a letter) represents an actual situation
(e.g., a sound). But representation in general refers to more than a pure denotation.
The notion of a representation is used if the represented and the representing have
something in common that is immanent in the reference relation. An example would
be a causal relation: Smoke refers to re as its cause, a perception or a conception
refer to a stimulus causing them.
In this sense, a causal relation can be a representing relation if there is a natural
or articial system that retraces causally eected representational states to their
cause.18 However, not each eect carries information about its cause. Therefore,
causation and action must refer to each other typically so that a representation can
be functionally exploited by the information processing system (Dretske 1988).
The criteria of causality and functionality do not yet guarantee that the sys-
tem succeeds to develop environment-adapted behavior by using representational
processes. This is only possible if the represented and the representing coincide in-
sofar that the system obtains adequate meaningful information. This is the case if
the representation itself contains structural characteristics of what it represents.19
18Compare for instance Bechtel (2001). If there is no such actual \feedback" (e.g., if a photograph
is never looked at) the representation is still subject to potential feedback; it is designed for the
purpose of a \user".
19A purely external criterion, evaluating the distinction between correct and incorrect informa-
tion merely based on successful behavior in an environment, leads unavoidably to the question
which internal criterion has to be fullled so that behavior becomes successful. This is precisely
11For this reason, we will assume structural representation as an additional ingredi-
ent of information processing systems (Bartels 2005). This way, a representation
can encode, e.g., the heat extent of an external temperature by converting external
relations to internal relations.20
Such a kind of structural adequacy must not be confused with a similarity rela-
tion, as exhibited between an object and its photograph. The relation between the
representing and the represented can be considered as a mapping f. Presumably,
the assumption of an isomorphic mapping f : A ! B, relating each point in A to
one and only one point in B and vice versa, is too strong. Relaxing the requirement
of bijectivity (the vice versa), we have a homomorphic mapping, e.g., many points in
A may be mapped to the same point in B. This is possible in a structure-preserving
manner.21
3.2 Representation in Mental Systems
3.2.1 Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness
In addition to the conditions mentioned so far, a mental representation must satisfy
the special criteria of the mental. Decisive characteristics in this sense are inten-
tional and phenomenal content. Intentional content is here to be understood in the
broadest sense, namely that a mental representation refers to or is directed toward
something.22
the criterion of structural adequacy.
20Compare Dretske (1995), p. 2: \The fundamental idea is, that a system S represents a property
F, if and only if S has the function of indicating (of providing information about) the F of a certain
domain of objects. The way S performs its function (when it performs it) is by occupying dierent
states s1;s2;:::;sn corresponding to the dierent determinate values f1;f2;:::;fn of F".
21Compare Bartels (2005), pp. 30-45. Structure-preserving homomorphisms are also candidates
for the mapping of neuronal states to mental representations, compare Amit (1989), p. 85: \Not
all stimuli ... will be cognitively perceived, but only those that can make it ... within a biologically
prescribed time interval." See also Fell (2004), or Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2007).
22This wide notion of intentionality means that every state of an information processing system
is intentional. Due to its function this system entertains both a permanent \monitoring" (i.e.,
analog transmission) of internal and external domains (partially and globally) and a processing of
this analog information. It is possible to imagine a mental state with no particular content. Even
such a state would be intentional insofar as it maps a lack of registered content and can be utilized,
at least a posteriori, as information about the system state.
One can also consider concepts which cannot be analog transmissions and do not map internal or
external subdomains, e.g., the \thing-in-itself". They include intentionality as well because they
arise from a complex processing of analog and digital information and simulate some entity. In
this sense they represent \something".
Such a broad notion of intentionality remains open for all analog and digital forms of information
transmission. There are alternative positions conceiving intentionality as a propositional attitude,
thus presupposing conceptual consciousness for intentionality. An overview of denitions and
viewpoints is due to Jacob (2003).
12A mental representation is actualized if it is occupied by the state of a mental
system. But intentionality can be attributed to a mental representation even if
it is not actualized by a particular mental state. The phenomenal content of a
representation, however, is bound to its actualization by a mental state: it \is
somehow", or \feels somehow" to experience that particular mental state.23 The
concept of phenomenality as used here includes subjective qualities of perceptions
and feelings (perceptual qualia, bodily senses, feeling aspects of emotions).24
In the philosophy of mind it is much discussed whether both intentionality and
phenomenality are necessary for the denition of mental representations or whether
intentionality alone is necessary. An important point, which can contribute more
clarity in this regard, is the distinction between mental representations that are
potentially accessible to a mental system and mental representations which are oc-
cupied and thus actualized by the state of the system.25
Insofar as a reference relation between the represented and the representing as-
sures intentional content, non-mental information processing systems possess all
kinds of intentionality. Thus, intentionality seems not to be characteristic of the
mental unless one can dene a typically mental intentionality by introducing an
additional criterion. Phenomenal content is a most appealing candidate, but this is
hotly debated and not resolved yet.
3.2.2 Varieties of Mental Representations
Mental representations are basic elements of consciousness. In order to form the
spectrum of mental contents that can be consciously accessed, they are present
in dierent varieties. They cannot only be classied as analog models or digital
concepts but exhibit dierent sensory modalities, dierent section sizes, dierent
degrees of input linkage, of transparency and of reexivity.
Mental representations can arise through dierent sensory channels. They can
come in pure modalities, e.g. as purely visual or purely auditory percepts, or in
integrated modalities. For this to be possible, they must be capable of combining
data from dierent sensory modalities to a coherent representing state.
23Compare Nagel (1974) whose phrase \what it is like to be" has become an almost canonical
term for this qualitative aspect of mental processes.
24Another perspective on phenomenality, advocated by Kant, is that each content of conscious-
ness mediated by the senses is an \appearance", i.e., a phenomenon, even if (like in some abstract
concepts) it is not connected with any quality of experience. For the rich tradition of concepts of
phenomenology, including Hegel's and Husserl's approaches, see Smith (2003).
25This distinction suggests some similarity with Searle's (1992) connection principle insofar as
we assume that unconscious (potential) mental representations are possible conscious (actualized)
mental representations. Unlike Searle, we do, however, not refer to some \original" or \intrinsic"
intentionality of the former. Rather, a potential representation is understood as a representation
that was established previously but is not actualized at some later time. In neural terms, a potential
representation is actualized if a stimulus activates a particular neural assembly that was established
as its neural correlate.
13Mental representations represent dierently sized sections of domains external
or internal to the system, where each section is a coherent unit. In order to enable
this, mental representations must be able to become parts of new representations
and to connect with one another in a homogeneous way. They must be completely
embeddable and able to \smoothly" generate higher-order or global representations
(as the \world" or the \self"; cf. Metzinger 1993, p. 60).
This claries why the unity of all possible conscious representations diers from
a collection of individual parts. All mental processes of representations that are con-
sciously accessible are homogeneously embedded in a fundamental meta-representation,
a \representational ground" as it were. This embedding happens permanently, while
the ever-changing entire ow of mental information is represented. The global meta-
representation co-exists { mostly in the background { along with partial represen-
tations.
Mental representations depend on actual information input in dierent ways.26
Experienced percepts (so-called \presentations") are, as an analog processing of
actual situations, causally bound to a stimulus input. By contrast, stored percepts
or created analog models (simulations) are detached from stimulus inputs and can
represent independent of the actual present. They are retrievable at any instance,
without being bound to a corresponding factual situation. They oer the possibility
to simulate goal states and to orient our behavior toward them (Grush 2001).
Mental representations exhibit dierent degrees of insight into their nature as
representations. While it is clear to us that each simulation is a representation
to which we, as cognitive agents, contribute creatively, analog processing of actual
situations often appears to us as direct and immediate. Perceiving a star, we do not
have the impression of an internal representation of the star, but rather of the real
object itself. It seems to be simply given, not conceived or mentally constructed.
A \naive realist" in this sense assumes that external objects { mediated by causal
physical chains { are plainly perceived as such (le Morvan 2004).
An \indirect realist", by contrast, presumes that the brain generates a repre-
senting state, a mental representation, which is related to a stimulus and to inter-
pretational components. Thus, acts of perception not only depend on the integrity
of physiological functions but also on imprints of experience and specic cultural
contexts upon the perceiving subject. An instructive example for the fact that acts
of sensory perception are not just \photographs" of objects is the perception of
multistable stimuli. Two or more modes of perception alternate with each other
although the stimulus as such remains the same.27
26Basically, mental representations are distinguished by some independence of details of the
stimulus input. The reaction to a stimulus depends on many factors and typically cannot be
predicted with certainty. A reex describing a rigid coupling between stimulus and reaction is not
understood as a mental representation. See Fodor (1986) and Berm udez (1995, p. 195{201).
27The positions of direct and indirect realism are often not distinguishable as clearly as described
here. We use the notion \naive" to characterize an extreme position of direct realism. For instance
Gibson (1982), who understands himself as a direct realist, can hardly be called naive. His so-
14In general, perceiving subjects are aware simply of a perceived object and not of
their activity of representing it. In this case, representations are called \transparent"
or \semantically or phenomenally transparent".28 Transparency (as opposed to
opacity) means that a subject is not aware of its own representational processes
so that it does not adopt an exterior position toward its representations.
A further criterion for the distinction of mental representations is their degree
of reexivity, literally understood as a reference of a conscious state back to itself.
Mental states can be accompanied by other, higher-order states referring to them.
If the perception of a star is the simple phenomenal representation of a star, then
the perception that I just perceive the star would be a second-order representation.
\Higher-order thoughts" (Rosenthal 1986, Carruthers 2000) or \higher-order percep-
tions" (Armstrong 1981, Lycan 1996) of this kind are linked to self-consciousness.
They presume the global representation of an ego or self.
The manifold of philosophical attempts to dene self-consciousness and to de-
termine its role for phenomenal consciousness cannot be discussed here. In the
following, the approach by Metzinger, who conceives the notion of a subject, at
least partially, as an analog self-model of an information processing system, will be
discussed in some detail. Metzinger's position is of particular interest because it can
be tied to an interpretation of precategorial and acategorial experiences based on a
naturalistic theory of mental representations.
4 Acategorial Experience in a Representationalist
Account
Due to Metzinger, \world" and \self" are two global analog representations of a
special kind with which we inform ourselves continuously about the state of our
environment and of ourselves. He refers to them as world-model and self-model.
The world-model is a global representational state in which all information about
actual states and goal states is embedded. The conscious world-model contains
sections of this comprehensive representation. Naturally, it can also be formulated
digitally and conceptually. As a rule, the analog world-model always runs in the
background of partial representations that are in the focus of our attention.
The same holds for the self-model. It constitutes that part of the world-model
called ecologial perspective overrides the duality of stimulus and response, object and subject, by
a comprehensive system of conditional information. He speaks, thus, of an underlying unity that
can be split into two temporary units rather than of a primacy of an object { which would be the
viewpoint of a naive realist. Therefore, many an indirect realist can possibly integrate Gibson's
approach in their own understanding.
28Moore (1903) addressed this situation with the notion \diaphanous". Van Gulick (1997,
p. 437f) called it the \semantic transparency" of perception. While van Gulick's term indicates
a propositional understanding of knowledge, Metzinger (2003, p. 166f) speaks explicitly of \phe-
nomenal transparency".
15representing the information processing system itself. It portrays the system as a
centered cognitive agent referencing information to itself and its state in order to
secure survival and optimize behavior. The self-model represents this activity of the
system as an ego or self, placed in the center of the world.29
It is Metzinger's thesis that the self-model can be lost in altered or pathological
states of consciousness. As an example he refers to the phenomenon of \oceanic"
self-dissolution, which he relates to \mystical" states. The associated loss of the
self does not presume a change of perspective but rather a \liquidation", as it were,
of the self: \the complete deactivation of the centering function that generates
perspectivity" (translated from Metzinger 1993, p. 184). Metzinger asks whether or
not such a non-perspectival state of consciousness qualies at all as an experience
with epistemic content.
In his more comprehensive monograph Being No One, Metzinger (2003) indicates
a possibility how phenomenal experience can occur despite a lost ego-perspective.
He describes the pure (transparent) analog representation of the world-model, which
is activated in a \window of presence", as a limiting case of state consciousness, a
minimal kind of mental content capable of becoming conscious. Because no partial
representations evolve in addition to this limiting case, the world appearing to the
organism is unstructured. The organism experiences a uniform eternal now.
This does not happen from the perspective of the rst person. The experience
is subjective only in the weak sense that it is based on an internal model of reality
(Metzinger 2003, p. 559). For the experiencing subject nothing particular is present.
There is just a ground of reality { the fundament of the manifold of structured
aspects of reality. Since this scenario abstains from any categories, it refers to a
precategorial state.
The actualization of such a minimal kind of phenomenal consciousness is to be
distinguished from representation in the usual sense (as a representation of some-
thing particular). To avoid confusion we denote the global analog representation
of reality as \representational ground", or ground of consciousness. It contains no
further categorial dierentiations which would be necessary for more specic states
of consciousness. Mystical experience is often understood this way.
29The self-model consists of analog representations of rst and second order. Its basis is the
sensory self-model of bodily senses and of the body schema. The body schema is our image of the
body in its environment. It shows the spatial relation of the system to the exterior. The bodily
senses represent the totality of the interior body state, the phenomenal body-self.
The self-model of second order is meta-cognitive: The system represents itself as a thinking being.
Unlike the sensory self-model, the meta-cognitive self-model is not structured spatially but tem-
porally. From a naturalist point of view it is a higher-level representation of brain states.
Moreover, there is the emotional self-model, mapping the totality of interior states, both bodily
and mentally, in relation to a goal state. Emotions are sensed bodily, so the emotional self-model
is closely related to the bodily senses.
Summarizing, our self-model consists of various partial models which appear usually in combina-
tion with one another as a unique self in our awake consciousness (Metzinger 1993, pp. 151{176;
see also Metzinger 2003, pp. 265{427).
16However, another kind of mystical experience can be construed beyond Met-
zinger's framework. The ground of consciousness cannot only be experienced in
the non-categorial minimal kind of representing activity, but also in an acategorial
mode. This is possible if the representational ground is present simultaneously with
the presence of partial representations { however, not as an unconscious background
but rather as a conscious foreground. Partial representations remain intact as such
and coexist with an awareness of the representational ground. In this case, the self
would not be experienced as dissolved but could be preserved as one representation
among others.
An experiencable simultaneity of representational ground and particular repre-
sentations is possible if a mental state is not located within a representation, or
category, but outside of representations, for instance betweem them. A decisive
condition for this thesis is the consistent conceptual distinction of a mental state
and the representation that this state can actualize. This has been proposed as
early as at the end of the 19th century, when William James (1890/1950, p. 243)
argued that the dynamics of mental states (\the stream of consciousness") requires
them to be sometimes in and sometimes in between particular representations. In
such \in-between states" dierent representations can be experienced without being
individually actualized. For instance, they can be experienced as connected by the
representational ground apprehended between or beyond individual particular con-
tents. In other words, the continuous representational ground of a mental system
can ash up between individual actualized representations and become consciously
and phenomenally accessible to the system.
It is, then, a particular quality of an acategorial experience that individual rep-
resentations lose their transparency and become opaque. In this case, they are
not simply experienced as objects, but rather as objects conditioned by a repre-
sentational ground. They become real for us only within this ground. Once more,
acategoriality can be clearly distinguished from precategoriality: In precategorial
experiences, categorial representations are dissolved, in acategorial experiences they
become opaque, so that their dependence on the generating system becomes \aware".
Acategorial experiences do not imply that the representing system completely
loses contact to objects \as such" and switches from a naive realism into a subjec-
tivist solipsism where reality exists exclusively \for me". Rather, representations
can be understood, in their relatedness to system and environment, as mutually and
jointly created and real \per se".
The representational ground on which individual representations evolve can,
moreover, be construed as a unity reaching beyond the system and comprising being
and consciousness. For this ground, as a minimal case of a representation, is always
already related in two respects: to the extra-subjective origin of stimuli and to the
intra-subjective processing of these stimuli. This way it can be understood why in
some spritual and philosophical traditions the representational ground is addressed
as an absolute \ground", \ unity", or \being" (cf. Varela et al. (1993) for further
discussion).
17Insofar as this conceptualization of acategoriality does not build on actualized
categories, it permits an alternative to understanding the reexivity of representa-
tions as a conceptual reexion with \higher-order thoughts". An acategorial state
allows us to be aware of established categories although it is not itself categorial: no
second-order categories are needed for this kind of \perceptual" reexion. Instead,
the concept of acategoriality introduces a fundamental relationship between the
awareness of (established but not actualized) categories and the coexisting awareness
of the representational ground upon which those categories have been established.
5 Acategoriality in Cognitive Neuroscience
There are plausible indications that acategorial states as experiencable states of
mental systems do indeed occur concretely. A promising approach to their detailed
description is the nonlinear dynamics of networks of attractors, with which dynam-
ical properties of complex systems can be investigated. Formal mathematical tools
can be used to describe both mental and neural processes and their correlation.30
Without further discussion about possible relations between mental and neural sys-
tems, we will next demonstrate a number of key properties of nonlinear mental
systems and then use them to further our understanding of acategoriality in mental
processes.
5.1 Properties of Nonlinear Mental Systems
One approach to study mental activity consists of modeling mental processes as a
complex network of interrelated categorial representations and mental states. Such
models can then be investigated with a basic structure that is as simple as possible,
yet not too unrealistic.31
A mental state actualizes a categorial mental representation if and only if the
content of this representation is subjectively experienced. This leaves the possibility
of unactualized categories that have been formed in the past and may be actualized
at some point in the future. It is essential in this framework that mental states and
categorial representations are independent to begin with. Modeling them requires
two dierent concepts and two dierent types of dynamics.
The dynamics of mental states can be represented in a so-called state space
containing the set of all possible states. Two points are important in this context:
30The existence of neural correlates of mental states is a fundamental assumption in cognitive
neuroscience (cf. Metzinger 2000). It is an important object of research which neural correlates in
a certain situation correspond with which mental states. Although this does not provide an answer
to the question why consciousness arises at all (cf. Chalmers 1995 for this \hard problem of con-
sciousness"), insights about brain processes may suggest interesting ideas about the understanding
of mental processes.
31See Amit (1989) for corresponding conceptions of models that are inspired by neurobiological
facts.
181. The behavior of dissipative nonlinear systems can be characterized using the
concept of attractors. An attractor is a subspace of the state space which has an
\attracting" eect on states outside of it. An attractor stabilizes the dynamics of
the system intermittently (as long as the state of the system stays within it).
2. Phases of the dynamics that are stabilized by attractors alternate with un-
stable phases, where states are outside attractors, during the course of time. Insta-
bilities or phase transitions may occur at typical critical parameters.
With respect to a mental system this means that complex behavior may emerge
from simple basic structures. The corresponding patterns exhibit signicant types
of stability (acccording to the corresponding attractors) and can be described as
(multi-) causal responses of the system to perceived or conceived stimuli.
A representation of this process including all possible unstable and stable states
cannot only be achieved in a state space. An alternative option is a so-called poten-
tial representation where valleys (local minima) refer to attractors and peaks (local
maxima) refer to unstable points. Other possibilities are saddle points (minima in
one direction and maxima in another) or plateaus (no potential dierence).
Initiated by some stimulus, the dynamics of the state of the system is represented
by its trajectory through the potential landscape, like the trajectory of a moving
ball. If it reaches the ground of a valley it stays there for a while. The state of
the system is then stabilized by the corresponding attractor. Another stimulus or
an internal renewal mechanism is required to change the state so that it moves into
another local minimum.
Each local minimum stands for a mental representation that may or may not
be actualized by the mental state at a given moment in time. An attractor in the
mental state space, which stabilizes the system intermittently, corresponds with a
stable categorial representation. Subsequent stable periods of a mental state are
separated from one another by mental instabilities.
5.2 Acategoriality as Mental Instability
A detailed quantitative description of the nonlinear dynamics of mental processes is
currently unavailable. However, for a conceptual study such as the present one the
qualitative mathematical properties of such processes are more important. It can
be plausibly argued in the framework of a qualitative stability analysis of nonlinear
systems that mental states can realize the key features connected with acategoriality
(for more details see Atmanspacher 1992, Atmanspacher and Fach 2005).
As mentioned before, a crucial point in this framework is the distinction between
mental representations and mental states. Formally, this distinction is reected by
the distinction between the potential landscape of a system and its actual mental
state. Describing the motion of mental states  in a potential V , dierent scenarios
are possible, depending on the complexity of the potential landscape. A particularly
simple discussion, sucient for illustrative purposes, leads to the following three
kinds of states:
191. The gradient of the potential V vanishes, providing a at plateau, so that
no categorial representations are present. In this case, every mental state  is
marginally, but not asymptotically stable. Each small perturbation by a stimulus
input entails a change of . A corresponding experience could be a precategorial
experience characterized by the non-existence or dissolution of perceptual models or
conceptual categories.
2. The state  is stabilized at a local minimum Vo of V , and stays there. In
such an asymptotically stable position perturbations are damped out, if they do
not reach or exceed the depth of the potential valley around Vo. The corresponding
experience is a stable representation, a perceptual or conceptual category.
Shallow minima stabilize the state  less than deep minima, so that it is easier
for stimulus inputs or other renewal mechanisms to change . It can be pressumed
that purely perceptual models, not yet classied conceptually, are destabilized more
easily. Thus, preconceptual experiences can be related to such shallow minima.
Fast switches between dierent representations in states of intoxication or passing
associations in states of dreaming or daydreaming are examples.
3. Local minima in V are established but the state  does not stay in them and,
therefore, does not actualize the corresponding representation. Rather,  stays at
a local maximum (or a saddle point) V1 between adjacent minima. Such a state is
intrinsically unstable and tends to relax into one of the neighboring asymptotically
stable states. From such an acategorial state, representations next to V1 can be
apprehended { not because they are actualized by  but as potentially accessible
representations connected by V1.
Spinoza's scientia intuitiva resembles this scenario by apprehending the ground-
ing essence of particulars. It contains both dierentiated structure and a unifying
ground at the same time. Spinoza calls the latter natura naturans or God (Spinoza
1994, I, P29, Schol.). In German idealism, it is already understood as \ground in
consciousness" (Henrich 1992), which is closer to our concept of a representational
ground (Feil 2007).
In acategorial states, this representational ground is not obstructed by actual-
ized categories (perceptual or conceptual), but can be shifted from an unnoticed
background to the foreground without losing the structure of the represented world.
In the same sense, the represented structure of the self remains intact as such but,
as all other representations, is present to awareness in a subtle potential fashion.
In contrast to precategorial experiences of undierentiated oneness, acatego-
rial experiences can be very complex. The homogeneous unity of the representa-
tional ground and the dierentiation of partial representations can be conceived as
a merged unity { a unity of oneness and dierence. This way, the most global of all
representations, the world-model, would be present to awareness in two kinds: dis-
tinctly structured and dierentiated on the one hand, and uniformly homogeneous
on the other. Both aspects together are consolidated in a most comprehensive ex-
perience of reality.
Epistemologically considered, acategorial experience refers to knowledge expe-
20rienced with a high degree of mental presence, based on an analog experience of
the representational ground. This is also the case for the accompanying awareness
of potential representations that are not actualized because no mental state resides
in them. Nevertheless, they may be apprehended as explicit digital categories in
coarsened and conceptually delineated form. In an acategorial state these categories
are not \thought" in the sense of discursive, sequential processing but they are
immediately and directly apprehended at once and as a whole.
Yet another quality of the experience of acategorial states is conceivable. If the
adjacent representations move out of the focus of attention and the representational
ground dominates the experience, this may produce some \indeterminate" presence
of reality (or being). This kind of acategorial \view" would also be subject to
relaxation into a neighboring potential minimum, requiring that adjacent categories
are intact and accessible. This is a distinct dierence from pre- or non-categorial
states.
It is an essential condition for acategorial experiences that the unstable mental
state at a local potential maximum can be maintained temporarily, i.e. stabilized. As
of today, it is an open question how this can be accomplished. One proposal is that
acategorial states might be realizable by the stabilizing impact of the interaction
of dierent unstable domains of a potential. For corresponding analytical studies
of specic types of networks see Atmanspacher and Scheingraber (2005). The key
result of this and related work is that locally unstable behavior is stabilized by global
interactions, thus leading to massive alterations of the potential landscape.
Alternatively, one might imagine acts of mental balance whose performance im-
proves with progressive training. Contemplative practices of numerous mystical
traditions suggest that acategoriality could be a matter of intense mental exercise
indeed. In principle, acategorial states may also occur spontaneously, but they are
unlikely to be accessible as subjective experiences as long as they remain intrinsically
unstable. Studies with meditation practioners have shown (Carter et al. 2005) that
such unstable perceptual states, as in binocular rivalry, can be maintained much
longer than for ordinary subjects in such studies.
6 Acategoriality as Non-Conceptual Experience
The experience of states with non-conceptual content, briey non-conceptual ex-
perience, has become a signiant topic in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science since more than a decade. Besides the review by Bermud ez and Cahen
(2008), a splendid overview of the eld is the introduction to the anthology edited
by Gunther (2003). It starts with a number of historical examples pointing out that
non-conceptual experience has been a subject of attention for a long time: it can
be found in Taoism and Buddhism, and in occidental philosophy. Gunther gives an
impressive selection of quotes due to Ockham, Bonaventura, Berkeley, Kierkegaard,
Schopenhauer, Homann, Russell, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others.
21The pertinent literature distinguishes three kinds of non-conceptual contents of
experiences: (i) the content cannot be represented conceptually, (ii) a subject does
not grasp the concepts involved in its articulation, and (iii) it does not or cannot
exercize those concepts. Here, content is usually assumed to refer to the intentional
content (or intentionality) of a representation. Intentional content explicates the
reference relation of a representation to what it represents. If the represented is a
state of aairs to which the truth conditions of classical logic are applicable, then
intentional contents are propositional contents.32
Using the notion of a concept basically equivalently with that of a mental rep-
resentation implies that non-conceptual means non-representational. In this case,
content is restricted to intentional or propositional content, as the property of a
representation, and non-conceptual content becomes a contradiction in terms. The
solution to this problem is that one may still speak of the content of an experience
instantiated by a mental state even if that state does not actualize a representation.
Tye (2005, p. 223) describes such a situation by saying that \experiences be con-
tentful non-conceptual states, where a contentful non-conceptual state is a contentful
state, the tokening of which does not involve the exercize of concepts".
The distinction of mental states  and mental representations V indeed provides
us with a formal vocabulary to delineate conceptual from non-conceptual experiences
precisely in the same way as categorial states are delineated from pre- and acate-
gorial states. While conceptual content is clearly the content of a categorial mental
state actualizing a mental representation, non-conceptual content can refer to three
options:
(A) precategorial mental states in the absence of representations of any kind,
i.e. dissolution of self and world as discussed in Section 4;
(B) precategorial mental states which are purely analog representations, e.g. phe-
nomenal experiences or analog models prior to the construction of concepts;
(C) acategorial mental states in the presence of fully conceptual established rep-
resentations none of which is actualized.
Experiences of type (A) and (B) fall into class (i) of non-conceptual experi-
ences: Content cannot be represented conceptually. Type (C) is more subtle, and in
our opinion many mystical, aesthetic, and existentialist examples given by Gunther
(2003) belong to them. Depending on the detailed interpretations of classes (ii) and
(iii) of non-conceptual experiences, they can be assigned in the following way: If \to
grasp a concept" means \to actualize a representation", then type (C) is clearly of
class (ii). But, although \grasping" in (ii) is often considered as a presupposition for
\exercizing" in (iii), acategorial states may permit a kind of exercizing of potential
representations without actualizing, i.e. grasping them.
32Some such positions are mentioned in Sec. 2.2. From our point of view, it makes sense to
extend the meaning of content to unconceptualized \primordial" percepts.
22Is it possible to address these and related questions in terms of research in cogni-
tive neuroscience? Although most spectacular anecdotal descriptions of acategorial
states are those of mysticism and aesthetics, we think that for a start into system-
atic research it is more promising to investigate typical examples in the psychology
of perception. Crane's (1988) example of Escher's waterfall illusion is a pertinent
example for a visual paradoxical stimulus, and likewise one might look into other
kinds of paradoxes.
An even milder, simpler, and more ordinary form of potential acategoriality is
to be expected in ambiguous (rather than paradoxical) stimuli, where the mental
representation of the stimulus keeps switching spontaneously on a typical time scale
of some seconds. Such oscillatory behavior can be modeled by the motion of the
mental state from one representation to the other and back, and so forth. The
state in between the representations is acategorial. Kornmeier et al. (2009 a,b) have
collected a number of intesting psychophysical and psychophysiological results that
address this situation.
7 Summary
Acategoriality is a theme with a philosophical tradition that is largely ignored in
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. It can be demonstrated, however, that
acategorial mental states are consistently conceivable on the basis of a scienti-
cally oriented approach to consciousness by adding more structure to the classical
representationalist stance. We argue that, in an acategorial mode of knowledge,
a representational ground (a minimal representation of reality) can be consciously
phenomenally experienced together with fully developed particular categorial repre-
sentations. By contrast, precategorial experiences occur in the absence of categorial
representations, where a mental state can still be capable of the experience of phe-
nomenal content.
This thesis can be supported by the idea of a qualitative stability analysis of men-
tal processes, implemented in the framework of the nonlinear dynamics of attractor
networks. Acategorial states are here conceived as mental states in an unstable
phase, outside of stable categorial representations (attractors). Such a view is based
on a distinction of mental states and mental representations. This distinction is a
mandatory ingredient for the coherent discussion of intrinsically unstable states out-
side of categorial representations without implying the dissolution or annihilation of
those representations.
This move allows us to ascribe non-conceptual content to states rather than rep-
resentations, thus avoiding an inherent contradiction that arises if representations,
conceived as concepts, are attributed non-conceptual content. Precategorial states
then entail experiences with non-conceptual content that cannot be represented
trivially (due to the absence of representations) or refer to phenomenal experiences
prior to the construction of concepts. Acategorial states entail experiences with non-
23conceptual content which need more sophisticated discussion. Examples of possible
research areas are the perception of ambiguous or even paradoxical stimuli.
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